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Did Booker Increase Disparity? Why the Evidence Is
Unpersuasive

The Sentencing Commission’s recent report on the effects
of United States v. Booker makes a number of very worrisome claims. The most alarming is that the gap in sentences between otherwise similar Black and White men has
nearly quadrupled: from 4.5 percent before Booker, to
15 percent after it, to 19.5 percent after United States v.
Kimbrough and United States v. Gall.1 The Commission
further claims that interjudge disparity has increased in
two-thirds of the federal districts, and that interdistrict
variation has also increased.2 If its findings were accurate,
and if these changes could be causally attributed to Booker
and its successors, it would clearly raise very serious policy
concerns. The Commission evidently believes that Booker
has in fact created a problem, because it concludes by proposing changes that would essentially undo Booker and
restore presumptive guidelines.
Fortunately, however, the Commission’s conclusions
are unsupported. The best available evidence suggests that
racial disparity in the federal criminal justice system is
a persistent problem, but has not worsened after Booker
(much less as a result of Booker). There are a number of
problems with the Commission’s approach, but the most
important are (1) its misleading method of measuring disparity and (2) its failure to use methods that can support
valid causal inferences about Booker’s effects. Here, I
describe each of these problems and summarize the key
findings of my own recent study of Booker’s effects, coauthored with economist Marit Rehavi, which was designed to
avoid these problems and which reaches conclusions contrary to the Commission’s. The study, which includes
a more detailed critique of the Commission’s methods, is
forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal.3 Our study and my
discussion here focus on race, but the methodological
concerns also undermine the Commission’s findings on
interjudge and interdistrict disparities.
I. The Commission’s Misleading Measure of Disparity

In any study that seeks to isolate the legally unwarranted
components of sentence disparity, researchers must try to
make sure that the cases they are comparing are similar.
Ideally, researchers would want to have perfect information
about the defendant’s true underlying criminal conduct and
control for it, but of course getting such information is
impossible. But researchers can at least identify the component of disparity that is unexplained by observable,

legally relevant variables. They usually employ some form
of regression, a statistical tool that is useful for estimating the
relationship between a particular variable (here, race) and
the outcome (sentence length) when other ‘‘control’’
variables (for instance, crime characteristics and criminal
history) are held constant. The Commission emphasizes
the strengths of this approach, but there is nothing inherently trustworthy about regression. There are many ways
for regression to produce misleading estimates, starting
with the omission of appropriate control variables or the
inclusion of inappropriate ones. In the Commission’s
regression model, three key controls are the ‘‘presumptive
sentence’’ (the bottom end of the Guidelines range), the
statutory minimum, and ‘‘departure status’’ (whether and
in what direction the judge departed).4 All three are deeply
problematic.
Consider, first, the presumptive sentence. Controlling
for this variable means that the Commission is in essence
asking whether Blacks and Whites in the same cell of the
Guidelines grid received the same sentences. But the
Guidelines cell is not a simple proxy for underlying conduct
and criminal history. It results from discretionary processes—charging, plea bargaining, and fact-finding—
which might be just as susceptible to racial disparity as the
final sentencing decision is. If so, then Blacks and Whites
with the same underlying conduct would end up in different Guidelines cells, so comparing blacks and whites in the
same Guidelines cell would be apples-to-oranges. Suppose,
for instance, that Blacks and Whites averaged the same
actual sentences relative to their presumptive sentences, but
that there was serious disparity in fact-finding, such that
Blacks received offense levels averaging six levels higher
than Whites with the same underlying conduct. In this
hypothetical, defendants with the same underlying crimes
and criminal histories would end up with sharply different
sentences depending on their race, yet the Commission’s
method would misleadingly estimate zero racial disparity.5
The same concern arises with respect to the mandatory
minimum, and there is good reason to believe that
mandatory minimums are an important source of racial
disparity in sentences. In another recent study, Prof. Rehavi
and I found that Black male federal defendants were nearly
twice as likely as White men to be charged with a mandatory
minimum offense, after controlling for the arrest offense,
criminal history, and other prior characteristics; this
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charging gap appears to explain more than half of the otherwise unexplained Black–White sentence gap.6 Yet the
Commission’s method filters out the share of sentence
disparity that is driven by mandatory minimums. More
generally, it filters out any contributions of prosecutorial
decisions to sentence disparities, even though the dominant role of prosecutors in shaping federal sentences is
widely recognized.7
Even if for some reason one thought it sensible to focus
exclusively on judges’ decisions, the Commission’s method
does not even capture all aspects of the judicial sentencing
decision. As noted above, its estimates exclude disparities
in sentencing fact-finding. Moreover, by including the
departure status control, the Commission also filters out
any disparities in departure rates and direction—a bewildering decision. What the Commission is left estimating is,
essentially, disparities in departure magnitude (and choice
of sentences within the Guidelines range). But the average
departure that Black or White defendants receive depends
on the rate, direction, and magnitudes of departures taken
together; trying to analyze magnitude while controlling for
rate and direction is nonsensical.8
In fairness to the Commission, the practice of controlling for the presumptive sentence and mandatory minimum is common in the sentencing literature (though the
addition of the departure status control is the Commission’s own unfortunate innovation).9 The reason for this is
probably data limitations. Sentencing data sets, most notably the Commission’s, are typically limited to the sentencing stage, making it hard to assess disparities emerging
from earlier stages. But the fact that a practice is common
or convenient does not make it correct, and researchers
have not advanced a justification for this approach other
than necessity. Fortunately, an alternative approach is now
possible, as explained in Part III.
When designing a regression model, it is important to
have a clear sense of exactly what one is trying to measure—
here, we want to know what kinds of ‘‘sentencing disparity’’
are important for normative and policy purposes. Although
this inquiry is complex, one core principle that seems
uncontroversial is that policymakers should aim for equal
treatment by the whole criminal justice system—not just for
equalizing sentences relative to the Guidelines cell and the
mandatory minimum.10 And if that is policymakers’
objective, they should not make decisions based on
empirical studies that assess the sentencing decision in
isolation.
The Commission’s narrow approach risks counterproductive policy recommendations. If one conceives of ‘‘sentence disparity’’ strictly in terms of departures from the
Sentencing Guidelines, then the solutions one considers
will likely focus on constraining those departures—as the
Commission’s proposal does. But there is good reason to
believe such constraints might actually increase the sentence gap between Blacks and Whites with the same
underlying criminal conduct. Constraining judicial discretion, historically, strengthens the power of prosecutors,
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whose charging and bargaining decisions more directly
determine the sentence.11 And if (as our research suggests)
prosecutorial decisions are a key source of disparity, shifting power from judges to prosecutors might make disparity
worse. In fact, we found that the Black–White sentence gap
was heavily driven by the cases in which judges have the
least sentencing discretion—those with mandatory minimums. Likewise, it is premature to turn to tightened sentencing Guidelines in response to interdistrict and
interjudge disparities when there are no empirical studies
as to whether prosecutors’ decisions also vary—within or
between districts—in ways that create sentence disparities.
Indeed, the Commission itself cites anecdotal evidence that
they do vary, but then ignores that evidence’s implications
for its policy proposals.12
II. Causal Inference about Booker’s Effects

Even if it were measuring disparity correctly, the Commission also provides no basis for concluding that Booker,
or its progeny Kimbrough and Gall, actually caused the
increase in unwarranted sentence disparity that purportedly
occurred in recent years. Causal inference based on
changes over time is a fraught enterprise because many
things change over time. Racial disparity might grow over
a period of years for many reasons. For instance, changes in
the underlying case mix, changes in DOJ priorities, or
changes in the composition of the bench or U.S. attorneys’
offices might all have racially disparate effects. The Commission’s method provides no way to distinguish Booker’s
effects from background trends or unrelated events.
Instead, the Commission simply conducts separate
regressions on four different samples, divided by sentencing date: (1) from United States v. Koon (1996) to the PROTECT Act (2003), (2) between PROTECT and Booker,
(3) between Booker and Kimbrough/Gall, and (4) after
Kimbrough/Gall. The Commission then simply compares
the estimates from each period of the average effect of
being Black on the sentence. It finds the smallest effect in
period 2 (when the Guidelines were at their tightest), a big
rise in period 3, and a further rise in period 4. One basic
problem with this approach is the Commission’s unconventional choice to run separate regressions for each time
period, which means that the effects of the various control
variables are not held constant across time periods.
More fundamentally, a finding that racial disparity was
larger after Booker does not mean it got larger because of
Booker. Suppose, for instance, that racial disparity increased
gradually at a constant rate from 2003 (when the PROTECT
Act passed) to 2011 (the end of the study period). If this
were true, it could entirely explain the Commission’s
results: the later time periods would have larger average
disparities. But if this continuous background trend was
not altered when Booker and Kimbrough/Gall were decided,
there is no logical reason to think the cases had any effect
on disparity. In fact, even if Booker and Kimbrough/Gall had
slowed the rate of increase in disparity, the average would
still be higher in the later periods. In that case, the
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Commission’s method would suggest that the decisions
increased disparity even though they actually had the
opposite effect.
In other words, the Commission’s method tells us
nothing about Booker’s causal effects. This is true not just
for its racial disparity analysis, but also for its analyses of
other disparities. And yet the Commission’s policy recommendations assume that Booker created a problem that
needs to be fixed.13
III. An Alternative Assessment of Booker’s Effects
on Disparity

In our forthcoming article, Marit Rehavi and I present an
alternative analysis of Booker’s effects on racial disparity
that reaches very different results.14 Using linking files
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, we constructed
a multi-agency data set that traces cases from arrest through
sentencing, so that we could assess disparities throughout
the post-arrest justice process. Our sample consisted of
non-immigration cases involving Black and White
defendants from 2003 to 2009—the period in which the
Commission found the most dramatic rise.15
Instead of the presumptive sentence, mandatory minimum, and/or departure status, our key crime-severity
control was the arrest offense. The Marshals’ Service records
arrest-offense information in detail (430 distinct codes),
which means this is a much richer offense-type control
than the broad categories (e.g., ‘‘drugs’’) that the Commission uses. We further supplemented it with additional
arrest offense-related details from other fields. Other control variables included criminal history category, education,
age, gender, district, and U.S. citizenship. Controlling for
the arrest offense means that our disparity estimates do not
capture disparity in the arrest process, but they at least
capture the aggregate sentence disparity produced from
charging through sentencing—a much broader swath of
the criminal process than that covered by the Commission’s
estimates.16 In short, we considered whether otherwise
similar Black and White defendants who were arrested for
the same crimes ultimately ended up with different
sentences, and whether this race gap changed over time.
We also conducted additional analyses to assess disparities
(and changes in disparities) in particular stages such as
charging.
We find that Black arrestees do face significantly longer
sentences compared to similar White arrestees—but the
good news is that there is no apparent increase in disparity
over the period 2003 to 2009. Indeed, we actually find
a decline in disparity, though not a significant one.17 The
Commission’s finding of an increase over that period is an
artifact of its misleading approach to defining disparity,
excluding the components of the sentence gap that are
driven by unexplained disparities in charging, plea bargaining, fact-finding, and departure rates.
These long-term trends (or lack thereof) do not tell us
anything about Booker’s causal effects, but we conducted
additional analysis to get at the causal question, using

a rigorous method called regression discontinuity design
(RDD). This method filters out continuous background
trends in racial disparity, assessing whether there are sudden breaks in those trends just after Booker. If we assume
Booker is the only important sudden change occurring right
at that time, then such trend breaks can probably be
attributed to the decision. The central limitation of RDD is
that it does not assess Booker’s long-term effects; unfortunately, there is no good way to analyze those effects rigorously. However, focusing on the short-term effects can be
informative. After all, Booker had a very sudden effect on
departure rates; they jumped by nearly ten percentage
points in the first month, a sharp break in an otherwise
smooth trend.18 If judges were inclined to use their newfound discretion in ways that increased racial disparity, one
would expect at least some of that effect to be seen right
away, because judges began to exercise that discretion
immediately.
Using this method, we find no evidence that Booker
increased aggregate sentence disparity—in fact, we find
a small but statistically significant reduction of disparity in
Booker’s immediate wake.19 Nor do we find any notable
racially disparate changes in charging, charge bargaining,
fact-finding, or departures.20 Indeed, the only notable effect
of Booker is the sudden increase in departures, but that
increase appears to have benefited Black and White defendants equally.
IV. Conclusion

The Commission’s report is alarming, but the alarm is
unfounded. To date, there is no convincing evidence that
the Black–White sentence gap is larger after Booker or its
progeny, and certainly no evidence that the gap grew
because of Booker.21 Moreover, the report’s methodological
flaws are also applicable to its findings concerning interdistrict and interjudge disparities. There is no reason to
consider the Commission’s ‘‘solutions’’ at this point,
because there is no evidence that Booker has created
a problem.
The Commission recommends requiring substantial
weight to be given to the Guidelines, greater justification
for large departures, heightened appellate review of policybased departures, and appellate deference to Guidelines
sentences. These proposals are in tension with Booker, and
especially with Kimbrough, Gall, and United States v. Rita,22
and their constitutionality is therefore unclear, but I leave
that point for others to explore. Regardless, the evidence
suggests the proposals would be unwise policy: tightening
judicial discretion seems, if anything, likely to be a counterproductive response to racial disparity.
Finally, even beyond the disparate treatment question,
tightening the Guidelines would effectively increase the
severity of federal sentencing law, which would disparately
impact Black men because of their disproportionate
involvement in the justice system. By allowing more
downward departures for both Blacks and Whites, Booker
has somewhat softened the Guidelines’ rigidity. If
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Congress is concerned about the extraordinary rates of
incarceration of Black men, increasing severity across the
board is no solution.
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